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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates whether earnings quality (EQ) has improved after the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Malaysia. It also examines whether 
institutional ownership is related to higher EQ and whether IFRS adoption moderates this 
association. Using a system generalized method of moments (GMM) on a sample of 1960 
firm-year observations over the period 2007–2016, we find that EQ is significantly 
enhanced after adoption of IFRS in Malaysia. The findings also show that institutional 
ownership has a negative impact on accrual earnings management, leading to high EQ. 
This impact increased after IFRS adoption, indicating that institutional ownership is 
effective in improving EQ after IFRS compared to pre-period. Our findings indicate that 
regulators and practitioners should focus on institutional ownership and IFRS as 
monitoring mechanisms that remain an essential determinant of EQ. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
EQ is a crucial issue that has emerged after a series of accounting scandals and financial crises around the 
world. EQ appears as an essential measure of financial health that reflects firm financial performance 
(Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou, 2016), market efficiency, and economic growth (Uyar, 2013). It is also 
essential for the efficient allocation of financial sources in stock markets. Several business agreements such as 
executive compensation contracts and other economic and political decisions depend on such indicator (Anuar 
et al., 2014). Therefore, corporate earnings need to be protected and monitored carefully.  
Nevertheless, corporate managers attempt to manipulate earnings to obtain several benefits at the 
expense of stakeholders. Some of the areas that can be manipulated are executive bonuses and self-reputation 
(Amran and Ahmad, 2013). Such breaches provide an ambiguous view of firm financial performance and, 
hence misleading investors in making operational and strategic decisions (Ji et al., 2015). According to Habib 
and Azim (2008) “When managers manipulate earnings, corporate profits become a less certain measure of 
firm performance” (p.171). Further, information users view the EQ as “Information with lower earnings 
management practices” (Barth et al., 2008, p.469). Therefore, improving monitoring mechanisms and 
ensuring high-quality accounting standards are important to reduce cases of earnings manipulations. 
IFRS adoption plays a vital role in improving corporate transparency, comparability and quality of 
financial reports (García et al., 2017). It is a mechanism that can monitor and reduce earnings management 
manipulation. IFRS features are more detailed, require more disclosures and permit fewer alternatives of 
accounting methods relative to numerous national accounting standards (Doukakis, 2014). Such features can 
reduce the cost of capital (Persakis and Iatridis, 2017) and attract foreign investments to local markets (Kouaib 
and Jarboui, 2017). Further, IFRS is expected to improve firm performance and encourage emerging countries 
to be more aligned with developed markets. 
The introduction of international accounting standards worldwide is a rationale for good corporate 
governance (CG). It is a mechanism to improve the financial environment of transparency, trust, and 
accountability. It is also a tool to monitor opportunistic managerial behavior. The reliability and the quality of 
earnings are improved when earnings management behavior is monitored by proper governance mechanisms 
(Boucharebet al., 2014). In the presence of weak CG mechanisms, however, managers can act in their self-
interest at the cost of investors (Bryce et al., 2015). The weakness of CG is also the main reason behind crises 
and collapses of Enron, WorldCom, HIH and Asian financial crisis (Zabri et al., 2016). CG structure is 
divided into internal control mechanisms, which includes the board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics, and external control mechanisms, such as ownership structure and the market. Institutional 
ownership is among the external control mechanisms. 
Institutional investors are influential decision makers and they have high ownership in firms and this 
acts as an efficient monitoring mechanism (Zhong et al., 2017). The presence of such significant stockholders 
can change corporate management behaviors and protect investments through their monitoring sources and 
they depend on experts to provide them with professional analysis (Zhong et al., 2017). Institutional investors 
also have more incentives to engage in monitoring activities due to high costs they may incur related to 
earnings manipulations compared to small investors (Hadani et al., 2011). Additionally, they have less 
motivation to engage in earnings manipulations (Alzoubi, 2016) and thus improving the quality of reported 
earnings after IFRS adoption period. Both domestic and foreign institutional investors heavily invest in firms 
that apply such high-quality accounting standards (Hessayri and Saihi, 2018). Due to the substantial fall in 
information costs with the mandatory IFRS adoption, foreign investors are more likely to be ready to increase 
their investment allocation of assets (Hamberg et al., 2013). The question is, has the EQ improved after IFRS 
adoption? Does the institutional ownership effectively enhance the standard of EQ after the adoption of IFRS? 
Can the IFRS moderate this relationship? Thus, this study aims to investigate whether EQ has changed 
following the passage of IFRS in Malaysia. It also examines whether institutional ownership is related to 
higher EQ and whether IFRS moderate this association. The study provides empirical evidence for Malaysian 
regulators regarding whether or not institutional investors has efficiently monitored accrual earnings 
manipulations in the post-IFRS period. 
The following sections review literatures relevant to this area of study and this is followed by a 
description of the methodology adopted in the study. The remaining sections highlight and discuss the results 
followed by the conclusion of the study.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section reviews literature concerning IFRS, institutional ownership, and EQ to support hypotheses 
development.  
 
IFRS adoption and earnings quality 
The adoption of IFRS enhances the quality of reported earnings and market stability in developed countries 
(Dayanandan et al., 2016). In the Asian context, Joshi et al. (2016) point out that Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia benefit economically from international standards. These standards can also help companies attract 
foreign and domestic investors’ attention (Hessayri and Saihi, 2018) and adoption of these standards enhances 
firm financial performance (Kouaib and Jarboui, 2017). They are also a keystone of better transparency and 
comparability of financial statements (Yurisandi and Puspitasari, 2015). According to Doukakis (2014), 
financial analysts and decision-makers can easily monitor and evaluate corporate earnings among companies 
in different contexts. Empirically, studies in emerging and developed markets report evidence of high-quality 
earnings post-IFRS period (Dayanandan et al., 2016; Yurisandi and Puspitasari, 2015; Zeghal et al., 2011). 
For instance, Marra, Mazzola, and Prencipe (2011) use OLS regression on 222 Italian companies during 2003-
2006. They find that IFRS adoption improves both monitoring mechanisms and quality of earnings. 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) reveal that the implementation of IFRS contributes to higher EQ, more timely loss 
recognition, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in contrast with the national accounting 
norms. In Malaysia, previous studies suggest that IFRS adoption has a positive contribution on firms’ EQ 
(Wan Ismail et al. 2013) and economic growth (Joshi et al., 2016). Hence, after IFRS adoption period, 
accounting numbers give a true reflection of firm’s economic position and performance.  
However, other studies provide evidence that IFRS adoption increases the opportunistic behaviour of 
management, leading to lower EQ (Hessayri and Saihi, 2015). Some studies suggest that IFRS has little to no 
influence on firms’ EQ (Bryce et al., 2015; Doukakis, 2014). Further studies argue that the quality of reported 
profits depends on country-level factors such as legal system and investor protection level (Zhong et al., 
2017). 
Although IFRS are principle-based and have few differences with previous financial reporting 
standards (FRS) in Malaysia, it is vital to examine the relationship between IFRS and EQ. International rules 
might be an enhancing or obstructing factor of quality of reported profits. The fair value is among the 
significant changes in accounting after the implementation of IFRS in Malaysia. This replacement is likely to 
enhance information characteristics of relevance, timing, credibility and transparency (Wan Ismail et al., 
2013). Therefore, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
  
H1: Firm’s EQ is higher in the years after compared to the years before compulsory IFRS adoption. 
  
Institutional ownership and earnings quality 
Based on the active monitoring hypothesis, institutional ownership is an effective monitoring mechanism 
which can result in better operating performance (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Institutional investors often have 
substantial ownership in some companies. They include insurance companies, banks, pension funds as well as 
investment and financial institutions. According to the literature there are several reasons why institutional 
investors monitor performance of corporate managers. First, as substantial owners, institutional stockholders 
are more likely to be active information collectors and financial mediators (Hadani et al., 2011). Compared to 
minority shareholders, institutional stockholders prefer to apply right accounting procedures to monitor how 
managers protect their interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), thus reducing agency costs that maybe incurred 
(Hadani et al., 2011). Second, large institutional possession can efficiently mitigate managers’ opportunistic 
behaviors through external auditors (Rad et al., 2016). Third, potential institutional investors seek information 
about the good CG firms and ignore entrenched management firms (Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 
2009). Finally, institutional owners have more resources and ability to decline opportunistic earnings 
management, since they depend on experts to undertake securities valuation analysis and corporate monitoring 
(Zhong et al., 2017). Several studies support this view. They maintain that institutional investors encourage 
firms to improve disclosure and monitoring procedures as well as firm performance (Nagata and Nguyen, 
2017;  Rad et al.,  2016).  They  also  contribute  to  discouraging  levels  of  earnings  manipulation  behaviors  
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(Rebai, 2011; Zhong et al., 2017). For instance, using a random-effect modelling in four countries, namely, 
UAE, Morocco, South Africa, and the Philippines, Hessayri and Saihi (2015) examine the relationship 
between ownership structure and discretionary accruals during four years pre- and post-IFRS period. The 
findings show that substantial institutional ownership improves firm performance and EQ because managers’ 
manipulation practices are more likely to shrink with the presence of institutional ownership.   
On the other hand, the investment horizon (Bushee, 1998) and private benefits hypothesis (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989) argue that institutional ownership hurts firm performance and EQ. The investment horizon 
hypothesis claims that due to their short-term strategies institutional investors may cooperate with corporate 
managers and avoid monitoring them. Several reasons are consistent with this viewpoint in the literature. 
First, institutional owners often vote by leaving a company if they do not satisfy their goals rather than 
controlling or changing administrators (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). Second, institutions avoid enhancing CG 
and the quality of reported earnings due to short-term investments (Shayan-Nia et al., 2017). Third, hidden 
takeover inherited in concentrated investors encourage them to obtain benefits and private information at the 
cost of minority stakeholders “private benefits hypothesis” (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). Empirically, Al-
Fayoumi et al. (2010) suggest that such investors force corporate managers to provide higher earnings even 
through the misuse of accounting policies. Such policies encourage managers to manipulate earnings and 
reduce EQ. 
In the Malaysian context, the predictive ability of revenues is high when firms have substantial 
institutional ownership (Al-Dhamari and Ismail, 2013). In the presence of concentrated ownership, 
institutional shareholders are expected to demand more external auditing to protect minorities from 
expropriations of management and large stakeholders (Rad et al., 2016). They do so since they possess 
monitoring resources (Zhong et al., 2017) and their large size (Hadani et al., 2011) enables them to improve 
firm financial performance. Hence, the second hypothesis is given as follows:  
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of institutional ownership and 
firm’s EQ. 
  
Ownership mechanisms are more likely to increase firm’s EQ after IFRS period. This prediction is 
based on transparency and disclosure quality as well as comparability levels obtained after IFRS period in both 
developed and emerging markets (Yurisandi and Puspitasari, 2015). According to Hessayri and Saihi (2018), 
domestic and foreign institutional investors heavily invest in IFRS-adopted firms. However, there is a lack of 
studies regarding the link between institutional ownership and EQ after IFRS adoption in Malaysia. The 
implementation of proper CG mechanisms reduces accrual-based earnings management after IFRS (Bouchareb 
et al., 2014). Indeed, these improvements provide stakeholders with more information to better understand and 
assess firm accounting policies and reports. Additionally, the efficiency of several monitoring governance 
mechanisms increases during a post-IFRS period (Bryce et al., 2015; Kouaib and Jarboui, 2017). It is expected 
that institutional ownership will be more efficient in ensuring EQ during IFRS period in Malaysia. Therefore, 
the third hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H3: Institutional ownership is more efficient in increasing firms’ EQ after IFRS compared to 
pre- IFRS period. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample selection 
The initial sample consists of all the listed companies on Bursa Malaysia during the ten years period from 
2007-2016. The sample size selected comprises only non-financial firms reporting under national accounting 
standards for the years prior mandatory IFRS, and only firms applying IFRS after 2012. Financial firms are 
excluded because they have different regularity systems compared to other sectors (Hashim and Devi, 2015). 
The current study also excludes firms with incomplete CG data and observations and those changing financial 
year ended during the selected period. Further exclusions are companies that do not have fiscal year ended 31
st
 
December. We use the same financial year to ensure that the data collected is consistent across the year ended,  
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e.g. data collected on 30 June 2016 are for both 2015 and 2016 instead of one year.   Thus, the final sample is 
1960 firm-year observations chosen from 196 listed firms. This sample hence consists of all firms that have 
institutional ownership data.  
  
Measures of Earnings Quality 
The current study follows prior literature that uses the accrual-based earnings management to examine the 
relationship between institutional ownership and EQ pre- and post-IFRS adoption. Kothari et al. (2005) model 
is applied in this study to estimate the measure of accrual earnings management, namely, discretionary 
accruals (DAC). This model is essential for several reasons. First, compared to Jones (1991), Kothari model 
includes a constant term that maintains three explanatory variables. Kothari et al., (2005) suggest that the 
addition of an intercept reduces heteroscedasticity problem. Second, the original and modified Jones 
approaches restrain the intercept and treat the reciprocal of lagged total assets as an explanatory variable. They 
also replace the complementary of lagged total assets with a constant. These two alternative specifications 
give similar results and maintain only two explanatory variables, namely, revenues and property, plant and 
equipment (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005). Third, Kothari et al. (2005) argue that Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) model produces enormous estimated earnings manipulations whenever a firm grows in the 
event stage compared to the estimation period. Kothari model hence provides more reliable results (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). Finally, as Jones and modified models ignore firm performance (Khamoussi and Ben Abdelaziz, 
2016), the rate of return on assets (ROA) is added to control for variations in accruals resulting from changes 
in business conditions. 
Additionally, the current study uses absolute discretionary accruals.
1
According to Doukakis (2014), the 
absolute value is the best discretionary accruals measure due to the absence of a specific direction of 
estimations. The following model is to estimate discretionary accruals: 
 
TACit/TAit-1 = β0 + β1[1/TAit-1] + β2[(ΔSit – ∆RECit)/TAit-1] + β3[PPEit/TAit-1] + β4ROAit + εit   (1) 
 
After estimating Eq. (1) we use the coefficients to determine the non-discretionary accruals (NADC) 
from the following equation. 
 
NDAC= β0 + β1[1/TAit-1] + β2[(ΔSit – ∆RECit)/TAit-1] + β3[PPEit/TAit-1] + β4ROAit (2) 
 
Finally, we obtain the discretionary accruals (DAC) by subtracting total accruals from the non-
discretionary accruals resulted from Eq. (2). This is defined as: 
 
DACit= TACit/TAit-1 – NDACit (3) 
 
Where TACit is total accruals, TAit-1 is lagged total assets, ΔSit is change in sales, ΔRECit is change in 
net receivables, PPEit is net property, plant, and equipment, ROAit is return on asset, and εit is error term 
(DAC). 
   
Model Specification  
This study employs a dynamic model to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership, IFRS 
and EQ.  
 
DACit = β0 + β1DACit-1 + β2INSTOWit + β3IFRS + β4(INSTOW ∗ IFRS) + β5LnSIZEit + β6GRWTHit + 
β7LEVit + β8ROAit + β9BIG4it + ηi+ εit            
(4) 
 
Where INSTOW is institutional ownership, LnSIZE is firm size, GRWTH is growth rate, LEV is firm 
leverage, BIG-4 is audit quality, ηi is firm-specific effect and εit is the error term. Except the INSTOW and 
IFRS, the rest are control variables that can significantly affect firm’s EQ (Doukakis, 2014; Francis and 
Wang, 2008). All variables are operationally defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The absolute value is selected because of its ability to take accrual reversals following the phenomenon (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). 
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Dynamic Panel Data 
This study employs system GMM method to examine the association between institutional ownership, IFRS, 
and EQ. This model has several advantages compared to other panel approaches. First, the static models 
provide biased and inconsistent coefficients, due to the existence of lagged-dependent variables or possible 
endogeneity problem caused by explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2014). Second, system GMM provides 
consistent estimates even if endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems take place. Third, 
system GMM gives more efficient results than difference GMM even with unbalanced panel data, since it uses 
more instruments and consists of both level and first difference regressions (Roodman, 2009). System GMM 
is also appropriate with small time series.  
The consistency of GMM method depends on several diagnostic tests. First, Hansen/Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions examines the validity of instruments which should be uncorrelated with the error 
term. Second, AR (2) tests the existence of second-order autocorrelation. Third, the difference in Hansen test 
investigates the validity of extra moments’ conditions on system GMM. It calculates the difference between 
system and difference GMM Hansen tests. Failure to reject the three null hypotheses means that the 
instruments are valid and the model is correctly specified. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
Table 1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of research variables. It also 
reports that there is no multicollinearity problem via variance inflation factors (VIF). We first note that 
institutional ownership and IFRS have negative correlation with discretionary accruals. Additionally, the 
mean value of firms’ discretionary accruals is 7% which is consistent with the prior literature (Ferentinou and 
Anagnostopoulou, 2016). The results also show that Malaysian companies have a high level of institutional 
investors (61%). 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient 
 Variables VIF Mean SD DAC IO IFRS LFS FG FL ROA 4B 
Discretionary Accrual (DAC)  - 0.07 0.09 1        
Institutional Ownership (IO%) 1.16 0.61 0.26 -0.02 1       
IFRS (Dummy) 1.05 0.48 0.5 -0.03 0.03 1      
Ln(Firm Size) ($ Millions) 1.28 5.06 0.62 -0.06* 0.35* 0.07* 1     
Firm Growth (GRWTH %) 1.05 0.08 0.38 0.09* 0.04 -0.16* 0.08* 1    
Financial leverage (LEV %) 1.01 0.40 0.38 0.08* 0.01 -0.07* 0.04 0.02 1   
Profitability (ROA %) 1.08 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.16* -0.07* 0.16* 0.15* -0.03 1  
Big4 (Dummy) 1.18 0.51 0.5 -0.08* 0.21* -0.05* 0.35* 0.01 -0.04 0.17* 1 
5% at significance the to refers * :Note       
 
Multiple regression analysis  
As shown in Table 2, the results present that specification tests of AR (2), Hansen and difference in Hansen 
tests are economically insignificant and hence valid. This implies that the empirical models are correctly 
specified and, therefore, we can interpret the results. Table 2 presents practical outcomes for accrual earnings 
management models by using two-step system GMM. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 show the estimated 
findings where discretionary accrual is earnings quality measure, while columns (3) and (4) include other 
measurements of control variables for robustness check. Additionally, the significant relationships among EQ 
measures and their lags confirm the use of dynamic models and support GMM application.  
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The impact of institutional ownership and IFRS on discretionary accruals  
The first objective of this study is to examine the impact of IFRS on EQ. As given in column (1), the results 
show that IFRS significantly decrease discretionary accruals at 10% level, indicating that IFRS can reduce 
earnings management and hence increase firm’s EQ. This result is consistent with previous literature (Wan 
Ismail et al. 2013) and with our suggestion.  
The second objective is to test the relationship between institutional ownership and accrual 
opportunistic behavior. The findings in column (1) indicate that institutional investors have negative impacts 
on discretionary accruals, suggesting that institutional ownership decreases firm’s discretionary accruals. This 
result is consistent with the prior literature (Hessayri and Saihi, 2015) and with our expectations.  
The third objective is to examine the moderating impact of IFRS on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and discretionary accrual behaviors over the period 2007-2016. As presented in 
column (2), the results indicate that institutional ownership is more effective in maintaining the EQ under 
IFRS compared to pre-period. The situation changed from a negative link between INSTOW and DAC, 
column 1, into a significantly negative association between INST*IFRS and DAC at a 1% level, column 2. 
The results show that institutional investors have less engagement in earnings management in the post-IFRS 
period, leading to high EQ.  This result is consistent with theoretical stand and previous literature (Bryce et 
al., 2015). 
More to the point, the results show that accruals earnings management has negative and significant 
relationships with firm size and profitability at 5%, meaning that big-sized firms with high profitability and 
audited by one of the big four companies are more likely to minimize accrual manipulations and hence 
increase EQ (Doukakis, 2014). However, it is positively associated with firm growth and leverage at 1% 
levels (Doukakis, 2014). This implies that firms with growth feature and less capital financing have lower EQ 
compared to their counterparts.  
 
Table 2 Institutional ownership and discretionary accruals, system GMM 
 Column 1  Column 2 Interaction Column 3  Column 4 Interaction 
DACt-1 0.121*** 0.122 *** 0.095 *** 0.102 *** 
INSTOWit -0.001 0.015 ** -0.001  0.011 * 
IFRSt -0.003 *  -0.003   
SIZEit -0.006 ** -0.007 *** -0.003  -0.004 * 
GRWTHit 0.025 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 
LEVit 0.006 ** 0.007 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
ROAit -0.073 ** -0.048   
BIG4it -0.004 -0.005 * -0.006 ** -0.006 ** 
ROEit   -0.016 *** -0.014 *** 
Constant 0.087 *** 0.081 *** 0.072 *** 0.007 *** 
INST*IFRS  -0.008 ***  -0.007 ** 
effects fixed-Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
effects fixed-Time No No No No 
Diagnostic tests     
No of instruments 61 58 61 58   
No. of groups 196 196 196 196 
Number of obs. 1746 1746 1743 1743 
AR(2)-p value 0.368 0.326 0.270 0.243 
Hansen test 0.287 0.336 0.207 0.314 
Diff. in Hansen test 0.367 0.316 0.272 0.258 
Note: ***, ** and * refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Robustness Checks  
Following previous literature (e.g. Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010), this study conducts several checks to verify 
the robustness of results. As seen in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2, the measurements of control variables, 
namely firm leverage, size, and profitability, have been changed. The measure of firm leverage is replaced to 
total debts to total equity. ROA is altered to return on equity (ROE), as a profitability indicator. Moreover, the 
firm size is replaced with the log of total sales instead of total assets. We run the models, columns (3) and (4), 
with new control variables’ measurements and the results remain consistent. The association between 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals is still negative. Furthermore, the IFRS also moderate this 
link, as the relationship is still significantly negative, and institutional ownership is still efficient. 
 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
The present study adds to the literature by investigating the moderating effect of IFRS on the link between 
institutional ownership and EQ from 2007 to 2016 in Malaysia. It also provides results using dynamic 
modeling. This study presents the following results. First, IFRS adoption significantly improves a firm’s EQ 
by reducing discretionary accruals. Second, a high percentage of institutional ownership has a significant 
adverse impact on earning management behaviors, leading to higher EQ. Finally, after IFRS period, 
institutional ownership became more efficient in mitigating earnings manipulations. The likely reason for this 
result is that institutional owners have monitoring skills to protect their investments and they apply accounting 
standards successfully.  
Our findings have some implications for the policymakers and practitioners. This work reveals that 
institutional ownership and IFRS enhance firms’ EQ. Regulators and practitioners should place greater 
attention on such monitoring mechanisms to decrease earnings manipulation practices. They should focus on 
the real implementation of IFRS in listed companies to attract foreign investors. Additionally, this study opens 
the door for future research in several dimensions. It opens broad avenues to study this relationship in an 
international context if data are available. However, this study did not consider the nonlinear relationship 
between institutional ownership and EQ to determine the optimal level of institutional ownership that leads to 
high EQ. It did not study the other ownership attributes and did not distinguish between foreign and domestic 
institutional ownership to see their effects on EQ. Another limitation of this study is that it did not focus on 
country-level factors to improve the efficiency of institutional ownership as a monitoring mechanism.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Abbreviations Variables Definitions   
TACCit Total accruals  The difference between net income and cash flow from operation 
DACit Discretionary accruals The difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals 
INSTOWit Institutional ownership Proportion of shares held by institutional investors to the total number of shares issued 
IFRSit IFRS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is post-IFRS adoption, 0 otherwise  
Big4it Big Four auditing Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by one of the Big4 auditing businesses 
and zero if otherwise  
GRWTHit Firm Growth The change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets.  
LEVEit Firm Leverage Total debt over total assets  
ROAit Profitability  Net income before tax over the average total assets  
Ln(SIZE)it Firm size  The natural logarithm of total assets  
 
 
